

## Message Text

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ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 EURE-00 ERDA-05 CIAE-00 H-01 INR-07  
IO-13 L-03 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-04  
PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 TRSE-00 NSC-05 ACDA-07  
/086 W

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P R 111710Z MAY 77  
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7252  
INFO AMCONSUL LENINGRAD  
USDEL SALT TWO GENEVA  
USDEL MBFR VIENNA  
DIA WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 6480

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PFOR, SALT, UR, US  
SUBJECT: BEECHER INTERVIEWS AT USA INSTITUTE

REF: A) STATE 105882, B) MOSCOW 6329

SUMMARY: BEECHER IS SURE SUYATOV WAS PASSING HIM AN UNOFFICIAL  
SIGNAL OF SOVIET WILLINGNESS TO MOVE MODESTY BEYOND VLADIVOSTOK.  
SUYATOV WAS NOT SPECIFIC ABOUT BACKFIRE CONSTRAINTS AND WAS  
ONLY TALKING OF BANNING DEPLOYMENT OF CRUISE MISSILES.  
BEECHER ALSO BELIEVES SS-20 WAS MENTIONED AS AN ELEMENT IN  
THE SUYATOV PACKAGE, BUT IS UNCLEAR IN WHAT CONTEXT. END SUMMARY.

1. BOSTON GLOBE CORRESPONDANT, WILLIAM BEECHER, GAVE  
EMBOFFS ADDITIONAL BACKGROUND ON HIS LONG CONVERSATION  
AT USA INSTITUTE MAY 4. BEECHER EMPHASIZED THE DISJOINTED  
NATURE OF THE INTERVIEW, WITH PEOPLE COMING AND GOING  
THROUGHOUT AND SAID THIS CAUSED ENOUGH CONFUSION  
AT TIMES FOR HIM TO HAVE LEFT SOME POINTS OUT OF  
HIS STORY RATHER THAN CONVEY A MISTAKEN IMPRESSION.  
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FOLLOWING ARE MAIN POINTS WHICH ADD TO OR CLARIFY  
WHAT HE WROTE IN STORY HE FILED.

2. BEECHER CLAIMS THAT GEORGIY SUYATOV APPEARED TO  
HAVE A SET PIECE WHICH HE WAS ANXIOUS TO  
DELIVER. AFTER BEECHER INITIALLY INTERRUPTED HIM  
SEVERAL TIMES WITH QUESTIONS, SUYATOV BECAME

TENSE AND INSISTED ON COMPLETING WHAT BEECHER CONSIDERED A "PACKAGE" BEFORE RESPONDING TO QUESTIONS. THIS ATTITUDE AND THE WAY SVYATOV TICKED OFF HIS POINTS CONVINCED BEECHER THAT HE WAS RECEIVING A PREPARED MESSAGE FROM SVYATOV. THIS WAS REINFORCED LATER IN THE CONVERSATION WHEN SVYATOV, HAVING FINISHED MAKING HIS POINTS, TOOK A SECONDARY ROLE IN THE EXCHANGE WHILE STREL'TSOV MOVED FORWARD AS THE PRINCIPAL INTERLOCUTOR. STREL'TSOV SEEMED TO BEECHER TO BE ENGAGED MORE IN PERSONAL SPECULATION AND OBSERVATION THAN WAS SVYATOV. FINALLY ON THIS POINT, ONE OF HIS SOVIET HOSTS (HE CANNOT RECALL WHO) REMARKED THAT AFTER ALL MR. WARNKE WANTED A COUNTER-PROPOSAL AND HINTED THAT SVYATOV'S PACKAGE WAS ONE. BEECHER'S RECOLLECTION OF THIS REMARK IS NOT COMPLETELY CLEAR AND HENCE HE DID NOT USE IT IN HIS ARTICLE.

3. BEECHER ALSO TOLD US THAT HE BELIEVES HE MISSED ONE OF SVYATOV'S MAIN POINTS WHICH HE RECALLS CONCERNED THE SOVIET SS-20 MISSILE. HE SAID THAT AS SVYATOV WAS LISTING HIS PRINCIPAL ELEMENTS, FOUR OF WHICH WERE LISTED IN THE STORY, HE MADE A POINT ABOUT SS-20 WHICH BEECHER DID NOT UNDERSTAND. UNFORTUNATELY BEECHER WAS UNABLE TO RETURN TO THE POINT LATER IN THE CONVERSATION AND WAS UNABLE TO RECONSTRUCT IT FROM HIS NOTES. AS A RESULT, HE SAID, HE DID NOT INCLUDE ANY REFERENCE TO THE SS-20 IN HIS FILED STORY. NEVERTHELESS HE BELIEVES SVYATOV DID SAY SOMETHING ABOUT THE SS-20 AS ONE OF THE ELEMENTS

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IN A POSSIBLE SALT TWO AGREEMENT.

4. OTHER POINTS:

--ON BACKFIRE CONSTRAINTS SVYATOV WAS NOT SPECIFIC, BUT LATER IN THE CONVERSATION STREL'TSOV WAS AND ASSERTED THAT THE ESSENTIAL PROBLEMS WERE AERIAL REFUELING CAPABILITY AND RANGE RATHER THAN BASING (THIS IS ALSO BEECHER'S PERSONAL VIEW AND, THEREFORE, MAY REFLECT SOME ACQUIESCENCE IN BEECHER'S ARGUMENTATION). --THE BAN ON CRUISE MISSILES IN THREE MODES APPLIED ONLY TO DEPLOYMENT, NOT TESTING, AND ONLY TO "STRATEGIC RANGE" CM. SVYATOV DID NOT CLEARLY DEFINE WHAT HE MEANT BY "STRATEGIC" ALTHOUGH HE USED THE FIGURES 2500 KM. AND 200 KM. SEVERAL TIMES IN THE CONVERSATION. STREL'TSOV WAS MUCH MORE CONCERNED ABOUT STOPPING CRUISE MISSILES REGARDLESS OF MODE OR RANGE AND IT WAS ONLY HE WHO, SPEAKING PERSONALLY, WISHED TO SEE CM TESTING BANNED UNTIL SALT III.

--THE CONCERN MENTIONED IN THE ARTICLE ABOUT MX WAS NOT INITIALLY EXPRESSED BY THE SOVIETS WHO FOCUSED MORE ON THE CRUISE MISSILE THREAT. ONLY AFTER BEECHER POINTED OUT WHAT HE FELT WAS SIGNIFICANCE OF THE U.S. PROPOSAL TO BAN MX DID HIS SOVIET INTERLOCUTORS RESPOND.

--SVYATOV SPOKE ONLY ABOUT LOWERING THE 2400 AGGREGATE CEILING AND NOT ABOUT THE 1320 MIRV SUB-CEILING.

--ALTHOUGH THE LIMITATION ON ICBM TESTS WAS ONE OF SVYATOV'S MAIN POINTS, HE DID NOT INDICATE ANY FIGURE TO WHICH TESTS WOULD BE HELD.

5. COMMENT: WE ARE ATTEMPTING TO SEE EITHER SVYATOV OR STREL'TSOV (WE HAVE BEEN CONTINUALLY REQUESTING CONFIDENTIAL

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APPOINTMENTS FOR SEVERAL WEEKS NOW) AND WILL TRY TO DRAW THEM OUT FURTHER ON THESE POINTS, PARTICULARLY THE REFERENCE TO SS-20. MEANWHILE, BEECHER'S COMMENTS REINFORCE OUR FEELING EXPRESSED IN MOSCOW 6329 THAT IUSAC STAFFERS WERE UNDER INSTRUCTIONS TO ORGANIZE THE MEETING WITH BEECHER TO PLANT A STORY IN THE AMERICAN PRESS WHICH WOULD INDICATE SOVIET WILLINGNESS TO MOVE MODESTLY BEYOND VLADIVOSTOK. BY CHOOSING THE "UNOFFICIAL" CHANNEL (INSTITUTE-TO-NEWSMAN) THE SOVIETS HAVE GIVEN SIGNAL WHILE AVOIDING COMMITMENTS BY SOVIET SALT NEGOTIATORS.  
TOON

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## Message Attributes

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